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The Last Monument Standing





During the latest uprising in Tunisia, the agitated crowd almost totally destroyed the
autocratic monumental landscape. As the provocative ‘Anti-Clock Project’ by visual
artist Nidhal Chamekh shows, the strongest element of this landscape was not de-
stroyed; it still stands in the capital today and illustrates how the imbricated strata of
the contemporary monumental landscape can be understood as an inherited
palimpsest that reveals hegemonic assumptions about the prevailing politics of time.
Themonumental translation of the new era promoted by the contested Ben Ali regime
paradoxically froze the idea that change would facilitate general progress, innovation,
modernization anddevelopment and guarantee a better future. In this article, we argue
that the Clock Tower and the civilization project it materializes, initiated by colonial
occupation and upheld by the consecutive postcolonial regimes, does not necessar-
ily warrant a better future. Rather, it continues to restrain political sensibilities in the
present time, dismisses historical pasts and withholds alternative futures.
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In the line of different political manifestos written during the 2011 revolu-
tion in Tunisia, visual artist Nidhal Chamekh (2011) uploaded a post entitled
‘Rational Solutions to Overcome the Artistic and Cultural Crisis’. Written in
the heat of the moment, the manifesto proposed to destroy the ‘November 7
Clock’ in the center of Tunis. All the references to ‘November 7’ were destroyed
by the rebelling masses, with the exception of the central clock monument.
Chamekh’s manifesto suggests destroying it with the sphere from the top of
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figure 1
The Anti-Clock Project—3DModeling
© Julie Grandin and Nidhal Cham-
ekh
the skeleton pillar of the infamous ‘City of Culture’. The crushed clock tower
would then function as a new memorial site of the revolution. Reduced to a
miniaturemodel in a 3Dprintedmapof Tunis, Chamekh’s iconoclastic proposi-
tionmaterialized four years later in the form of an installation. The ‘Anti-Clock
Project’ was exhibited during ‘All theWorld’s Futures’, the central exhibition of
the ‘Venice Biennial’ curated by Okwui Enwezor.
Nidhal Chamekh’s manifesto and installation not only guides our journey
through the symbolic landscape of Tunis, but through its focus on the last
monument standing, the cartographic installation also proves conducive to
our understanding of the politics of time and memory in the Tunisian Revo-
lution and its monumentalization today. Approaching Tunis’s urban space as a
place imbuedwithhistory clarifies howboth thepedestal of the lastmonument
standing and the ideology it materializes were initially conceived and struc-
turedduring colonial occupation, andwere slightly transformedduring the two
consecutive postcolonial regimes. The monumental landscape was a constitu-
tive element of the civilizingmission and the assimilationist urbanization poli-
cies of the French colonial administration (Coslett 2017). Independence grad-
ually facilitated an ambiguous entanglement of colonial and nationalist forms,
mimicking the original symbolic economy of veneration (Mbembe 2013). The
partial destruction of this economy of veneration and its colonial and nation-
alist entanglement sharply contrasted with ‘the possibility of annihilation’ or
the prerequisite of ‘tabula rasa’ as aminimumdemand of every decolonization
process (Fanon 1952: 117; Fanon 1961: 35). As the postcolonial ideal of ‘creation
ex nihilo’ and ‘the desire for the purity of new beginnings’ faded away, a more
pragmatic reading of cities and their monuments as palimpsests of different
times and histories imposed itself (Huyssen 2009: 7).
During the latest revolution, the annihilation of themonumental landscape
succeeded in breaking up time and challenging normative notions of tem-
porality in a way that pushed some scholars to exclaim the end of postcolo-
nialism (Dabashi 2012). However, as Chamekh’s installation reminds us (see
fig. 1), even though the monumental landscape may be annihilated, the land-
scape’s last monument still stands today and—aswe argue—will probably still
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stand tomorrow as itmaterializes a soothing hegemonicmodernist and future-
oriented temporality that mystifies and restrains political sensibilities in the
present time, dismissing certain historical pasts and withholding differential
futures.
1 Our 14Will Never Be 7×2
In the celebratory demonstrations following the toppling of their dictator on
14 January 2011, protesters held banners marked with the viral slogan: ‘Our 14
will never be 7×2’. This slogan was self-evident for most Tunisians, but a diffi-
cult, if not impossible, one formost non-Tunisians to comprehend.Thenumber
seven is key to deciphering the slogan: over the last twenty-three years that
president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali ruled Tunisia, the number seven came to sig-
nify adherence to the regime. It began on Saturday morning 7 November 1987
when, still acting as prime minister, Ben Ali sent seven doctors to the palace
of Habib Bourguiba, the first president of independent Tunisia (Auffray 2011)
to push him aside after over thirty consecutive years as president. After build-
ing his military career to become the head of national security, Ben Ali rose in
ranks to serve as minister of state before being appointed interior minister and
finally primeminister. On 7November 1987 amedical report attested that Bour-
guiba was unable to continue his duties. Ben Ali then declared on public radio
that the president was ‘senile’ and therefore ‘mentally unfit to govern’ accord-
ing to article 57 of the constitution (Saidi 2007). BenAli’s first solemn historical
radio speech later became known as the ‘November 7 Manifesto’ and quickly
acquired the status of a founding document, heralding the beginning of a ‘new
era’. Announcing the necessary democratic and social reforms, BenAliwas sup-
ported by the majority of Tunisians. He promised ‘historical change’ and thus
a radical rupture with the repressive authoritarianism of the former president.
A second foundational text arrived with the first (but certainly not the last)
anniversary of the ‘new era’, when different political formations approved of
the ‘National Pact’ on 7 November 1988. The historical day Ben Ali took presi-
dential power thus heralded the ‘NewEra of Change’. Soon, however, the regime
started to lose its support and legitimacy.
If Habib Bourguiba built his power on behalf his historical legitimacy as the
father of independence and was therefore acknowledged as the personifica-
tion of power, his successor was pressed to invent another historical legitimacy
(Abassi 2009). In his last legal constitutional mandate in 1999, the regime pre-
pared for a constitutional referendum in 2002 that would allow the president
to run for an unlimited number of terms and increase the age limit for presi-
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dential candidates to seventy-five. Through consecutive manipulated electoral
victories, the official discourse took the form of a future-oriented civilizational
project in which ‘change’ was underpinned by the ‘eternal values’ that facili-
tated the necessary adjustments for ‘democratic and pluralistic progress’.1 In
the sameway that his predecessor depended on the refinement of a personality
cult to preserve a semblance of legitimacy in 1978, the Ben Ali regime materi-
alized the hegemonic discourse of the ‘new era’ in an ubiquitous monumental
landscape. Public space was saturated with monuments referring to ‘Novem-
ber 7’, with or without an inserted standard clock.2 ‘November 7’ became ‘the
numerical emblem’ of what was called the necessary ‘change’, which would
open ‘a new era’ (Auffray 2011). The date of the coup became a symbol of new
power relations, forming what I call the ‘Novemberist monumental landscape’.
However, the way the annual ‘November 7’ spectacle unfolded (Chomiak 2013),
and how different artistic interventions gradually diverted the digit toward the
end of authoritarian rule, speaks volumes about a premonitory sense of revo-
lutionary dissent (Ben Yakoub & Zemni 2019). During the latest revolution, the
monumental landscape was, finally, almost completely destroyed.
Next to material (Hibou 2006) and coercive domination (Ghorbal 2013),
symbolic domination is a prerequisite for autocrats (Wedeen 1999). The way
political power is symbolically produced, paradoxically invites transgression, as
power encloses within itself the framework of its own defiance (Wedeen 1999;
Tripp 2013). The spatial concentration of political power in the ‘Novemberist
landscape’ likewise made it the primary site for political resistance (Chomiak
2013). The revolution could indeed be read as a campaign to dismantle BenAli’s
symbolic numerological fixation. The spontaneous but systematic destruction
of Novemberist monuments was a clear precursor of the demand for the auto-
crat’s departure (Chomiak 2013). The iconoclastic rage of protesters almost
destroyed all monuments and street signs referring to ‘November 7’ (Zemni
2013).
1 See, for instance, the official press release for ‘the anniversary of change’ in 2009, in which it
was called ‘an impetus for renewing hope and confidence in the future’ (Tunis Afrique Press
2009).
2 Since the 1990s, artist and photographer Hichem Driss has collected photographs of nearly
all the ‘7’ monuments. After the toppling of the president, he found the freedom to select and
put together ‘Sept fois c’est fini’ (Seven: this time, it’s over) a series of 7×7 black and white
photographs of the monumental landscape.
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2 Politics of Time
Revolutions are generally acknowledged as historicalmoments of fundamental
political change. The temporal dimension of the Tunisian revolution, however,
seems to be an often-overlooked site of contestation (Sadiki 2015). Stimulated
by the creative occupation of public squares, an over-emphasis on the cate-
gory of space threatens to overshadow a growing body of work that focuses on
questions of temporality. When time is not overlooked and is taken seriously
as an element of political analysis, it is regarded as a ‘scarce and nonrenewable
resource’ that ought to be managed (Schedler and Santiso 1998: 10), and not
as a ‘horizon’ created by the interaction of present, past and future (Schedler
and Santiso 1998: 6). Moreover, the ‘largely descriptive chronometric analy-
ses … have failed to articulate the revolutions beyond their chaotic, unfold-
ing eventfulness’ (Sabry 2012: 80). As Siino’s (2012) contribution to the debate
shows, political analyses of time can easily be reduced to a simple assessment
of the rhythm of presidential succession. The methodological and epistemo-
logical importance of the use of different temporal registers in the study of
revolution cannot be underestimated (Schwedler 2016). When revolutions are
taken as units of analysis, the temporal register of the medium-term is often
over-asserted at the expense of the long-term. The fixation on the precarious
democratic transition structured by the teleological nature of the literature on
democratization makes one neglect the impact of long-term processes such as
the unfolding of capitalismor the persistence of colonial power relations.How-
ever, the transformative events of the revolution irreversibly opened up tempo-
ral horizons that thoroughly re-imagined the scope of the political (Schwedler
2016). As shown by Chollet’s (2012) reading of the revolution, through Walter
Benjamin’s theses on the philosophy of history, it becomes clear that the revo-
lution radically contested the concept of (economic) progress ingrained in the
everyday politics of the regime.3 Criticizing this hegemonic teleological con-
3 In the curatorial statement of ‘All the World’s Future’, the international art exhibition where
the ‘Anti-Clock Project’ was first shown, Okwui Enwezor also refers toWalter Benjamin’s alle-
gorical interpretation of Paul Klee’s painting ‘Angelus Novus’ as the ‘Angel of History’. By
referring to the 9th thesis on the philosophy of history he invites the public to rethink the
representational potentiality of art and its capacity to relate to the current state of things.
By underlying the cult status of the artwork obtained through historic clairvoyance of its
critic, Enwezor turns his curatorial sight to the past to make sense of ‘All theWorld’s Futures’.
Through this turn toward the past to grasp differential futures, he challenges artists to engage
with a certain critical historicism, from the perspective of the unfolding disquiet context of
crisis, uncertainty and insecurity, but by being aware of and focused on the accumulated
debris of the devastations and catastrophes of the last two centuries.
308 ben yakoub
Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 12 (2019) 303–327
ception of progress and development, Chollet (2012) manages to analyze the
revolution in what he perceives as a progressive line of revolutions that goes
back to 1789 (FrenchRevolution) continues through 1871 (Paris Commune), 1917
(Russian Revolution), 1956 (Hungarian Revolution), and 1989 (the Tiananmen
Square movement in China). This reinforces the idea that Tunisians are late,
and are only now becoming truly modern and catching up with the train of
history (Khiari 2016).
In this analysis of the temporal dimension of the Tunisian revolution I pro-
pose to focus on the multiplicity of times subsumed in the age of the post-
colony (Mbembe 2001). In this light, time is understood ‘not synchronically
or diachronically, but in its multiplicity and simultaneities, its presence and
absence, beyond the lazy categories of permanence and change beloved of so
many historians’ (Mbembe 2001: 8). These emerging and entangled times of
existence and experience are characterized by the interlocking of multiple pos-
sible presents, pasts and futures, that through their constant fluctuation and
oscillation lose their irreversibility and set the condition to experience time
bodily.We do not necessarily want to question the ‘Western-ness of modernity’
(Mbembe 2001: 11), but rather propose to further engage in the often-neglected
subject of historical time, analyzing how the Tunisian revolution succeeded in
breaking up time and challenging normative notions of temporality through
its monumental contestation (Lorenz and Bevernage 2013).
3 Monumentalization of Temporalities
Apart from the representation of time in the ‘Novemberist monumental land-
scape’ in the form of a clock, and in its reference to the historical day of the
coup, the monumental landscape itself is already inextricably related to a
sense of time, as it can be considered the materialization of what Mbembe
(2006) calls the conscious task of symbolizing the past. Even if it might seem
to be the last concern for a society pressed by the imperatives of survival,
this process of symbolization is a sine qua non to form a dignified collective
body politic, whichwas the drive behind the revolution.Memorialmonuments
therefore cannot be minimized as mere decorative objects in the green spaces
that enliven concrete cities (Sebag 1998). The ‘bodily experience’ and the ‘vivid
sensationof intersubjectivity’whenencountering a statue remindus thatmon-
uments exercise their own power over and above that exercised by the state
(Kros 2015: 153).
As Achille Mbembe (2013) suggests, a monumental landscape can be dis-
cerned as a series of artifacts that pretend to be ‘the latest substitute of the
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substance of time itself ’, whereas actually it is a trap of ‘a rebellious time’ that
refuses to be caught between the hands of any potentate.Monuments enhance
the illusion of permanence and intergenerational continuity, and by doing so,
tangibly elevate the sovereign above all temporal contingencies (Augé 1995).
The monumental landscape then fixes and delineates an image of a past, giv-
ing it a semblance of ‘real past’ inscribed in stone (Wallerstein and Balibar
1991: 78), to avoid ‘the past [catching] … up too fast with the present’ (Trouil-
lot 1995: 11). It essentializes time and sculpts in bronze the contours in which
time can be thought. Through this process the monumental landscape encap-
sulates the subject within the outlines of an imposed conception of the past,
excluding the possibility of experiencing time outside these sculpted lines.
In the words of Fanon (1952: 180), it ‘encases’, ‘enslaves’ and provokes one-
self to ‘be sealed away in the materialized Tower of the Past’ (Fanon 1952:
176).
Through the endless reproduction of the date of the coup and the cen-
trality of the image of universal time in the form of a mechanical clock, the
Ben Ali regime added a layer of power to its monumental landscape. Time is
essentially a concept that organizes repetition and transformation, but it also
has a profound ideological nature, as it is subsumed in the imaginary of the
global system (Mignolo 2011). The clock, like the steam engine, is a symbol of
the industrial standardization necessary for the global modern capitalist age
to come into being. Metrically pulsed with a fixed rhythm, the clock enables
perfect synchronicity and thus universallymeasured and controlled timeman-
agement (Stalpaert 2016).What Fabian (1983: 29) calls ‘Western Clock Time’ or
‘Physical Time’ is today divided up into nanoseconds to ensure the accuracy of
high frequency trading on volatile global financialmarkets.More than a system
of reckoning time, the image of the clock encloses ways of knowing, sensing,
remembering and understanding the past, present and anticipating the future.
Consequently, it not only determines our conception and experience of time,
but our very conception of history andmemory (Mignolo 2011). History is then
understood as a progressive developmental process or transition following a
singular linear notion of time, with a past that is lost and an ever-changing
potential present that continually creates departures toward a singular future
in which we are all inevitably heading. Or ‘as a current that carries individu-
als and societies from a background to a foreground, with the future emerging
necessarily from the past and following that past, itself irreversible’ (Mbembe
2001: 16). The past is considered a fixed entity with only documentary value,
whereas the present is supposed to be the only site of the real that one can
truly experience (Vázquez 2009) This linear conception of history is charac-
terized by what Walter Benjamin (1968: 261) called ‘homogeneous and empty
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time’ and can be considered the very notion of historical time that underpins
the imagined community of the nation state (Anderson 1991).
The above-described spatial metaphor of temporality and secularized tele-
ological conception of time and history has repercussions on prevailing sub-
jectivities (Fabian 1983). The present of the self is depicted as ‘modern’ and
‘civilized’, whereas the present of the other is imagined as ‘traditional’ and
‘primitive’, in a progressive and chronological ‘development’ toward ‘civiliza-
tion’ (Fabian 1983; Chakrabarty 2000; Barba 2014).What according toMbembe
(2001: 4) supposedly characterizes a ‘traditional’ society is its facticity and arbi-
trariness ‘caught in a relation of pure immediacy to the world and to them-
selves’ and thus its inability to ‘[utter] the universal’. The disposition toward
the future was the monopoly of the colonizer, and was brought to the colo-
nized as a ‘magnanimous gift of civilization’ (Mbembe 2015). However, and
here lies the perverse paradox of colonization, at the same time the indige-
nous people were considered ‘ontologically incapable of change’, and therefore
pre-determined to remain ‘indigenous’, doomed to ‘repetition without differ-
ence’ (Mbembe 2015). In a traditional society, time is seen as ‘stationary’ and
‘resistant to change’, disintegrating the very idea of progress (Mbembe 2001:
4). Frantz Fanon (in Mbembe 2015) considers colonization as ‘a fundamental
negation of time’, where the colonized were a people without history, ‘outside
of time’, or whose timewas ‘radically out of joint’ and therefore had to be gently
led into history. Colonialism not only imposed its rule on the present and the
future of the oppressed, but also distorted, disfigured and destroyed the past of
the colonized (Fanon 1961). AlbertMemmi notes that then ‘the colonized is out
of the game. He is [in] no way a subject of history any more. Of course, he car-
ries its burden, oftenmore cruelly thanothers, but always as an object’ (Memmi
1965: 91–92). As a result of this forceful process of historical objectification,
the postcolonial subject interiorized apresumed structural imbalance between
tradition and modernity. It not only came to accept a ‘tragic duality’ or ‘inner
twoness’ (Mbembe2001: 12) anddevelopeda ‘bifurcated self-image’ (Saidi 2007:
21), but also developed a firmly ingrained inferiority complex (Fanon 1952)
toward his own supposedly ‘premodern’ tradition.
The ‘Novemberistmonumental landscape’ can be understood, first and fore-
most, as a form of symbolic dominance (Mbembe 2006; Mbembe 2013). It sat-
urates not only the living space, but also inhabits the imagination, troubling
its subjects, whose senses can no longer properly function without its mas-
ter signifier. The monuments and statues in public space exercise a form of
dominance much indebted to the colonial world, ‘a world divided into com-
partments, a motionless, Manicheistic world … a world sure of itself, which
crushes with its stones the backs flayed by whips’ (Fanon 1961: 51–52). In addi-
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tion, the reference to the historical date of November 7 and the mechanical
imageof universal timeadds an ingenious layer of power to this symbolic domi-
nance. Togetherwith other time devices, such as the calendar, the clock forms a
networked system thatmakes up a ‘panopticon of time’ (Sadiki 2015).Whenwe
look at the ‘oppressive use of Time’ (Fabian 1983: 2), and the inferiority complex
it generates, the omnipresent clocks take the shape of a powerful disciplinary
machine that not only regulates time, but disciplines our bodies and move-
ments to the point that we turn into temporal beings (Stalpaert 2017).
The initial energy of the revolution that destroyed the monumental land-
scape can be seen as a ‘clock-wise protest’ that broke up the ‘authoritarian
panopticon of time’ (Sadiki 2015: 5–6) and provoked an aporia of time (Sabry
2012). Moreover, as Sabry insightfully suggests, the revolution can be regarded
as a ‘a trans-temporal global event’ that unfolded in ‘different, fluid and com-
plex political/cultural temporalities’ and brought down ‘the redundant theo-
rizations of Arab historicism’ (Sabry 2013: 25). At the same time, the tenacity of
the last monument standing tragically reminds us of the still-dominant colo-
nial determination to repetition without difference, now no longer waiting for
the magnanimous gift of civilization, but for a transition to a dignified future,
for the magnanimous gift of democracy. Unless the masses find different ways
to again contest the strongly embedded panopticon of time, ‘transition’ can
againmake space for ‘revolution’, as JocelyneDakhlia suggests (2016). In the fol-
lowing section, we consider the proposition of the ‘Anti-Clock Project’ as one
that demythologizes the ubiquitous hegemonic conceptionof time andhistory,
and engages with the ambiguity of multiple pasts to create a profusion of pos-
sible futures, what in itself is one of the basic functions of memory (Mbembe
2006; Mbembe 2015). This, we hope, will contribute to the academic ‘stammer-
ing’ that brings us closer to understanding the ‘historical paradigmatic shift’
Tunisia is experiencing (Sabry 2013: 25).
4 Last Monument Standing
The scope of this article does not permit an elaboration on the ‘artistic and cul-
tural crisis’ that motivated the creation of the ‘Anti-Clock Project’ (Chamekh
2011). Our reading of this installation serves two purposes. First, methodologi-
cally, the installation is employed as a map to navigate the monumental land-
scape of the capital and prioritize which elements of this landscape to engage
with. Through a close reading of the cartographic installation and the sur-
rounding eleven drawings, extending the utopic artwork symbolically, histor-
ically and formally (Chubb 2015), we navigate its three central memorial sites:
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the ‘City of Culture’, the statue of IbnKhaldun, and the ‘November 7 Clock’. Sec-
ond, andmore conceptually, as an artwork the ‘Anti-Clock Project’ inspires fun-
damental reflection on the symbolic struggle over memory and the politics of
time at stake today inTunisia. The rather simple but disruptive questions raised
through the ‘Anti-Clock Project’ stimulate a look into the way political tempo-
ralities can be spatialized in a postcolonial context and thus how a revolution-
ary contestation of this postcolonial spatialization can raise profound ques-
tions related to the prevailing politics of time and memory. Tunisia is a partic-
ularly interesting case, with the postcolonial monumentalization thematizing,
in its entangled form and content, a clear modernist idea of change, progress,
time andhistory. In this light, the spontaneous destruction of this ‘Novemberist
monumental landscape’ succeeded in provoking an aporia of time. Reclaiming
this historical agency, themasses, at least for that catharticmoment of destruc-
tion, expelled their tragically bifurcated self-image. Together with the violent
destruction of the ‘Novemberist landscape’, the prevailing inferiority complex
and alleged incompatibility between tradition and modernity seemed—at
least for amoment—tobeannihilated. By shattering themonuments, the expe-
rience of time in its inherentmultiplicity and reversibilitywas reclaimed. How-
ever, as suggested by Chamekh’s installation, we have to apprehend the deeper
meaning of the incompletion of these revolutionary dynamics of monumental
annihilation. The partial nature of its destruction emphasizes the ingenious-
ness and power of the disciplinary structure set in place by the Ben Ali regime,
and the difficulty of completely overthrowing it. The incompleteness of the
destruction process relates to what Timothy Mitchell describes as ‘the produc-
tion of modernity’, where ‘the hegemony of the modern over what it displaces
as “traditional” is never complete’ Mitchell (2000: 18). This incompletion can
then be understood as themain drive of modernizing forces that ‘continuously
reappropriate elements that have been categorized as non-modern … in order
to produce their own effectiveness’ (Mitchell 2000: 18). The difficulty of total
annihilation can thus be explained by the comforting and normative character
of a modern unilinear temporality. The idea of history that reinforces binary
oppositions and mutual exclusivities and dismisses the imbrication of differ-
ent concurrent temporalities restrains political sensibilities to the present time
and precludes certain historical pasts, withholding differential futures.
5 Reading Tunis as an Urban Palimpsest
To clarify how political temporalities can be spatialized, and thus how the
recent revolutionary dynamics could consequently re-address these temporal-
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ities through a contestation of this spatialization, we navigate the complexity
of Tunis following themap outlined inNidhal Chamekh’s cartographic installa-
tion. The three central monuments proposed by the ‘Anti-Clock Project’ guide
our journey through Tunis’s symbolic monumental landscape.We focus on the
‘City of Culture’ on Mohammed V Avenue, around the ‘Big Ben Ali’ on the ‘Jan-
uary 14 Square’ and the statue of Ibn Khaldun on ‘Independence Square’. Each
of the three monuments has its own particular symbolism and its own specific
history, but together they are sufficiently representative to be acknowledged as
entry points to thoroughly engage in aprecise analysis of possible temporalities
materialized by the contemporary monumental landscape.
WeapproachTunis’s urban space as an ‘anthropological place’, that is, a place
that is not only relationally defined and concerned with identity, but also one
that is thoroughly historical (Augé 1995). By delving into the symbolic struc-
ture of its public open spaces, we further our understanding of the political
temporalities and histories at the center of these spatial arrangements. As Saidi
insightfully suggests (2007) and following de Certeau (1988), we approach the
city of Tunis and its monumental landscape as ‘palimpsests’. We thus focus on
the highly symbolic ‘stubborn’ places that together make up the monumen-
tal landscape, as ‘stratified places’ consisting of ‘imbricated strata’, where all
epochs survive and ‘pile up’, in the same place, intact but mutually interacting
(de Certeau 1988: 200–201). We must take care not to scrutinize only the most
recent stratum; on the contrary, we should be able to conceive ‘the interrela-
tions between disparate forces and times’ and ‘to reveal, decode and decipher
a system’ veiled by ‘superimposed orders’ (de Certeau 1988: 202). According to
Huyssen (2009), a close reading of the city as a ‘palimpsest of space’ or as an
‘urban palimpsest’, implies taking into account its transformable, permutable
and transitory character. Through a palimpsestic reading of Tunis and its mon-
umental landscape, it becomes clear that Tunis’s ‘urban imaginary’ is inhabited
by ‘differentmemories of what therewas before’, and also by ‘imagined alterna-
tives to what there is’ as ‘the strongmarks of present space merge in the imagi-
nary with traces of the past’, albeit with ‘erasures and losses’ (Huyssen 2009: 7).
Reading the palimpsestic nature of Tunis and its monumental landscape and
considering how the configurations of its urban space unfolded over time in
its mediation of memory, helps us ‘understand the fundamental temporality
of even those human endeavors that pretend to transcend time through their
material reality and relative durability’ (Huyssen 2009: 7). By taking a closer
look at restored traces or documented erasures, it becomes clear which con-
trasting ‘city texts’ are being rewritten and which are being preserved to form
the ‘complex web of historical markers’ that make up Tunis today (Huyssen
2009: 81). In what follows, we share our reading of Tunis as a vital anthropo-
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figure 2
Scarabaeus Sacer rolling a ball of dung
© Nidhal Chamekh
logical place and as an urban palimpsest, to reveal, decode and decipher the
ambivalent processes of symbolization that this monumental landscape has
undergone over time.
5.1 City of Culture
The opening of the the ‘City of Culture’ was initially planned for 7 Novem-
ber 2009 as part of the celebration of the 5th presidential re-election (Bint
Nadia 2015). The plans called for a grand monument of 52,000 square meters
that would house a theater, a cinema, a library, production studios, and audi-
toriums, and a national museum for modern and contemporary art. However,
due to financial mismanagement, the opening date was repeatedly postponed.
Designed in 1992, the construction of the ostentatious central cultural center
on the site of the former International Fair on Mohammed V Avenue, began in
2003, but was interrupted, then restarted in 2006, but stopped again in 2008.
The main entrance of the ‘City of Culture’ consists of an architectural copy of
the minimalist ‘Great Arch of Defense’ in Paris; this entrance serves as a door-
frame for an ornate oriental Arabic door.4 The concrete skeleton of the ‘Tower
of Culture’ was also already built. The glass geodesic sphere on top of the tower
is an element in a number of monuments built by the state in the 2000s; it visu-
alizes a globe and symbolizes the country’s will to be included in the prevailing
universal, contemporary and global values (Kazdaghli 2006). Ironically, over
time, the construction site became a symbol of the state’s (mis)appropriation
of public and private funds (Mannone 2015). Formost Tunisians, the sputtering
real estate project embodied the questionable financial maneuvers that were
deeply ingrained in the corrupt state structure (Karoui 2015). This popular cri-
4 Interview with Nidhal Chamekh, Paris 13 January 2017.
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figure 3
Islamist protesters climbing the November 7 clock to the
summit to wave the black flag, 2012
© Nidhal Chamekh
tique resonates with the drawing of the scarabs in Chamekh’s installation (see
fig. 2). Where most beetles use their ball of dung as a food source or brood-
ing chamber, Chamekh proposes to use the geodesic symbol of globalization
to crush the November 7 Clock. Since Ben Ali fled the country, the site laid
fallow until the former director of the real estate project, Mohamed Zine El
Abidine, was appointed minister of culture and announced the resumption of
the project.5
5.2 Big Ben Ali
The second central monument on the cartographic installation is a 37-meter
highmaster signifier of the monumental landscape, the last monument stand-
ing today on the ‘January 14 Square’. Before the revolution it was known as the
‘November 7 Square’, before the Ben Ali regime it was the ‘Africa Square’, and
finally, before independence it was the ‘Jules Ferry Square’. The clock tower
was personally commissioned by the president and designed by Hassairi Med
Habib. It resembles an abstract but well-balanced fusion of Big Ben in London
and the Luxor Obelisk in Paris. The tower is coated in bronze in a traditional
mashrabiyya (latticework) pattern; it is lit from within, and has a golden pyra-
midal rooftop (Coslett 2017). The four-sided clock tower is based in a circular
reflecting pool with a musical cybernetic fountain. The sides of the monu-
ment are identical, it overlooks the capital and is visible from every perspec-
5 Since his appointment as minister of culture in August 2016, Mohamed Zine El Abidine has
been harshly criticized for his involvement in the affair of the ‘City of Culture’ and for his
strong ties to the Ben Ali regime. A petition ‘Against the Sinister of culture: for a cultural pol-
icy that cuts with propaganda’ was signed by hundreds of prominent figures from the cultural
and artistic world, in an effort to prevent him taking office; the petition ultimately failed (Bel
Hedi, Fatma and Karim 2016).
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tive.6 From the outset, the Ben Ali regime constructed a political image that
was designed to differentiate itself from the previous regime, so that through
the idea of reform, renewal and change, it could heal the wounds caused
by the authoritarian legacy of his charismatic predecessor Habib Bourguiba
(Saidi 2008). The clock visualizes the need to constantly update oneself and
keep up with the continuous changes the country is supposedly going through
(Kazdaghli 2006). Through a constant emphasis on the present time, it insti-
gates a desire for the new, and at the same time, a sort of forgetting (Saidi 2008).
The monumentalization of the ‘new era’ of ‘change’ paradoxically froze during
the twenty-three years of Ben Ali’s rule; it propagates the idea that being up-to-
date facilitates general progress, innovation, modernization and development,
that catching up with the times would guarantee a better future for the gener-
ations to come. In sum, the clock tower can be read as a phallic symbol of the
prevailing desire for modernity.
The stubbornness of the place casts a shadow on the historical fact that the
clock is erected on exactly the same place as the master signifier of the colo-
nial monumental landscape. The basic stratum or pedestal of the landscape
saw the light of day as a constitutive element of the monumental translation
of the French civilizing mission (Coslett 2017). The statue was erected in 1911
in honor of the late Jules Ferry, in the middle of the newly established ‘Jules
Ferry Square’ at the eastern end of the main boulevard connecting the old tra-
ditionalmedina and the newly constructedmodern city. The statue sculpted by
Antonin Mercie was placed vertically; he looks over a Bedouin statuette offer-
ing him a bundle of freshly harvested alfalfa. A third statue of a settler sitting
down looks up at Ferry in full admiration. As president of the French senate,
Jules Ferrywas at the forefront of the negotiations that led to the establishment
of the protectorate in Tunis. When, in April 1881, an army of 28,000 marines in
a dozen French navy warships set foot on Tunisian land, they gained absolute
domination not only by the conquest of land and resources, but also through
the colonization of time (Gallois 2013).
Having played a key role in the Enlightenment, the French felt morally legit-
imized to ‘re-orient North Africans back onto the path of historical progress’
toward ‘a more human future’ (Gallois 2013: 253). Being in a class of their own,
the French administration promised to leadTunisia toward a better future. The
road to progress and the new forms of being contained in the future promise
of civilization were seen, however, as anachronistic. As many of the social and
intellectual changes the French foresaw had already been carried out, the colo-
6 Interview with Nidhal Chamekh, Paris 13 January 2017.
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nialists failed in their project of ‘temporal dismantlement and reconstruction’
because it promiseda visionof the future thatwas alreadypresent (Gallois 2013:
273). During the struggle for national liberation, the various elements of the
monumental landscape were vandalized, destroyed, and later replaced (Sebag
1998; Giudice 2009).
In 1956, the state held a ceremony around the unbolted monument of Jules
Ferry on the renamed ‘Africa Square’; several senior officials of the newly
founded independent government attended, along with a celebrating crowd.
But soon the empty square was neglected and reduced to a simple round-
about—until 1978. After twenty-two years of independent rule, and in light
of the sharpest social and economic challenges in the history of the postcolo-
nial regime, the square was refurbished with a triumphant equestrian statue
of Bourguiba (Fromherz 2011). Sculpted by Hechmi Marzouk and Amor Ben
Mahmoud (Karoui 2012), it eternalized the image of the historical moment
when the ‘eternal leader’ returned from exile after signing the Franco-Tunisian
agreement recognizing the internal autonomy of Tunisia. The president is
monumentalized, astride a galloping horse, triumphantly saluting the cheer-
ing masses, dressed in a modern tailored suite with a traditional chechia (a
brimless Maghribi cap with a tassel). Reminiscent of the equestrian statue of
Louis XV on the Place de la Concorde, the statue clearly mimics the French
monarchical trend toward equestrian monumentalization (Coslett 2017).
Independence provoked an ambiguous process of entanglement between
colonial and nationalist forms that represented the replacement of colonial
logic by a nationalist one, but in the very facts, recovering colonial senses by
mimicking the same symbolic practice of veneration. The postcolonial poten-
tate was molded and sculpted in metal, creating a ‘secular cult of the autocrat’,
inhabited by the same morbid power against which once fought (Mbembe
2006). This mimicry was but a symptom of a larger emerging disdain for past
traditions. Traditions underwent a process of folklorization as theywere instru-
mentalized by a rising tourist industry to satisfy the still predominant and often
internalized orientalist gaze (Saidi 2008).The rising tourist industry reflects the
postcolonial regime’s predilection for the western myth of progress. The exe-
cration of the past was considered necessary to put the country on the track
toward modernization, as Bourguiba himself emphasized, when he proposed
to, ‘raise the country up to the rank of developed countries’ (Saidi 2008: 106). In
June 1988, however, less than one year after Ben Ali’s ‘medical’ coup, the eques-
trian statue of Bourguiba in the center of Tunis was relocated to a space in a
park in the northern suburb of La Goulette, where the president first set foot
when he came back from exile in 1955. The statue was replaced by the first
version of the ‘November 7 Clock’. Once the ‘Mujahid El Akbar’ (The ‘supreme
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combatant’, as he was surnamed) was put aside, republican timewould start to
flow regularly. What became popularly known as the ‘Alarm Clock’, was prob-
ably the only clock tower in the world with a large number seven to mark six
o’clock (Siino 2012). With the renovation of the main avenue at the end of the
1990s, the outdated clock monument was replaced by the ‘Big Ben Ali’, which
stands today in honor of the third millennium.
In round-the-clock debates following the ouster of the dictator, the lastmon-
ument standing was given an important function. For the first celebration of
Labor Day since the revolution, the General Labor Union (UGTT) furnished the
clock with iconic pictures of the revolution, as a form of tribute. The clock was
only embellished for a few hours, as the police insisted that the photographs be
pulled downbecause theywere considered offensive toward their profession—
they depicted scenes of police violence. Before the labor movement’s action,
the theater collective ‘al-Halaka’ had already, in vain, proposed to change the
look of the clock tower for the celebration of the first anniversary of the rev-
olution. Nevertheless, during the next two anniversaries of the revolution, the
transitional government decided to dress the clock with the colors and sym-
bols of the national banner to counterbalance ongoing national controversies
related to flag desecration by Islamist activists. The image of jihadi activists,
who scaled the clock without ropes to wave the black standard during the day
of protest for the ‘Holy Quran’, is imprinted on the Tunisian collectivememory.
After the image of militants waving their banner from the clock tower went
viral, digital diversions popped-up in the online sphere, implicitly pointing at
the supposedly backwardness of these activists, for instance in the video the
‘Invasion of the clock’ (Benyoussef 2016). They compared this ‘conquest’ of the
clock in 2013 to the conquest of Mecca by the Prophet Muhammad in 630CE.
Another meme compared the action to the first moon landing in 1969. For
some commentators, their supposed backwardnesswas confirmed by the irony
of history, as their action happened the same day Europe adjusted its clock
to summer time (Chine 2012), thus implying that Tunisians remain ‘behind’
Europeans. On Chamekh’s apparently hopeful drawing, the clock shows five
minutes before twelve instead of five minutes after twelve as the viral picture
clearly showed (see fig. 3). However, he drew six insteadof seven jihadis, uncon-
sciously denying them some symbolic subversive agency.7
It was only in the context of the first presidential elections in November
2014, at the base of the latest constitution, that a political debate started about
the ‘Novemberist Clock Tower’. The interim president running for re-election,
7 Interview with Nidhal Chamekh, Paris, 13 January 2017.
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figure 4
Ibn Khaldun statue barbed on independence square.
Tunis, 2015
© Nidhal Chamekh
Moncef Marzouki (2014) (unsuccessfully) proposed, in a public post on social
media, a symbolic reparation, to replace the clock tower with a monument to
the glory of the martyrs. The rival, but winning candidate in the presidential
elections, Beji Caid Essebsi, stated that if he had the opportunity, he would
organize the return of the Bourguiba statue to its ‘natural place’. During the
campaigns, both presidential candidates proposed to remove the ‘Novemberist
Clock’, but as we see, neither completely succeeded.
5.3 Ibn Khaldun
Finally, the third place on Chamekh’s installation refers to ‘Independence
Square’, the square where the statue of Ibn Khaldun, the fourteenth-century
father of modern sociology and historiography, stands. Together with the
equestrian statue of Bourguiba, it was put up to symbolically counter the ram-
pant feeling of ‘national disenchantment’ (Béji 1982) after the masses rose up
against the liberal turn of the postcolonial regime, culminating in what is now
known as ‘Black Thursday’. Themonument, made by sculptors Amor BenMah-
moud and Zoubeir Turki, replaced the tomb of the unknown French soldier of
WorldWar II that was installed during the French protectorate. After indepen-
dence, the tomb was moved to the war cemetery, and in 1978 it was replaced
by the statue of Ibn Khaldun, which today faces ‘Big Ben Ali’ from afar (Coslett
2017). However, the statue of Ibn Khaldun (a philosopher holding a book in his
hands and draped in a traditional burnous and jalaba), which was 1.5 meters
shorter than that of the equestrian statue of Bourguiba, were connected by the
main avenue (Saidi 2007; Fromherz 2011). The relationship established through
the juxtaposition of the two iconic monuments seemed to imply a hierarchy
between themonument of the ‘father of the nation’, who stood in a higher posi-
tion, overseeing thenewcity, andoriented toward theWest, and themonument
of amedieval historian and sociologist, in a lower position, erected close to the
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old medina and oriented toward the East.8 The statue of Ibn Khaldun is popu-
larly known as the ‘Bedouin lost in the city’ or the ‘Marabout abandoned by his
followers’ or as the ‘formerCheikh of the ZitounaMosque expelled by the Bour-
guibist regime’ (Saidi 2007: 156). These processes of allocation, hierarchization
and symbolism not only turned the main avenue connecting the two monu-
ments into a spatio-temporal axis, but also implied a general process of subor-
dinating the past and its traditions in favor of the present andmodernity (Saidi
2007). As we can see on the drawing that contextualizes Chamekh’s installa-
tion, during the latest revolutions the statue of Ibn Khaldun was surrounded
by barbed wire (see fig. 4). Although at first it looked like it was (symbolically
at least) intended to protect the personification of the historic philosophic
consciousness of the revolution, it soon became clear that the army was only
protecting the French embassy, the former ‘colonial residence’ located directly
across from IbnKhaldun’s ‘independence square’, the former ‘residence square’.
Exactly seven months after the Venice Biennale closed and the last person
visited the ‘Anti-Clock Project’, the equestrian statue of Bourguiba was brought
back to the center of Tunis. As promised by President Beji Caid Essebsi, the
statue was effectively unbolted and removed from its previous location in La
Goulette where it stood for twenty-nine years. In an attempt to re-establish the
postcolonial Bourguibist consensus, the ‘second great return’ was inaugurated
by the latest president on ‘Victory Day’, for the celebration of the 60th anniver-
sary of the mythical return of Bourguiba from exile in 1955. It now stands
between the ‘November 7 Clock’ and Ibn Khaldun, on the main avenue car-
rying his name. Already in 2009, Essebsi stated in his visionary memoir Habib
Bourguiba. Le Bon Grain et l’ Ivraie [Habib Bourguiba: the wheat and the chaff]
that ‘when time will do its work’ and ‘history will override the news’, ‘Habib
Bourguiba will be released from purgatory and the equestrian statue of the
most illustrious Tunisian [will] resume its place in Tunis on the Habib Bour-
guiba Avenue, opposite the statue of Abderrahmane Ibn Khaldun, the most
illustrious Tunisian sociologist of all time’ (Essebsi 2009: 414). The return of
the equestrian statue was quickly contested, as the leader of the syndicalist
student movement (UGET) critiqued the president’s nepotism by tagging the
marble pedestal of the monument with the following phrase: ‘Send your son
back home, and your other relatives as well’. The statue now stands in front of
8 This juxtaposition has inspiredmany artists, certainly those engaged in literary circles during
the rule of Bourguiba, for instance, in the subversive poem ‘Nashid al-ayyam al-sitta’ (Hymn
of the six days) by AwladAhmed (1984), and during the rule of BenAli, in the plot of the novel
of Fawzi Mellah Le Conclave de la peureuse (1993) or more recently in the premonitory novel
of Kamal al-Riahi, al-Ghurilla (The gorilla) (2011).
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theministry of interior, in exactly the same place thousands of protesters stood
in January 2011 demanding freedom and dignity.
The counter-proposition to replace the clock tower with a monument for
the martyrs of the revolution is now long gone. As it spoke of a will to symboli-
callymaterialize the process of transitional justice, the propositionwould have
made legible immeasurable values—values that cannot be reduced to money
or sheer force. As such, a monument for the martyrs could have been under-
stood as the proper place from which it is possible ‘to transform in interior
presence, the physical absence of those who were lost’ and produce ‘the sup-
plement of life necessary for the recovery of the dead in a new culture that can
no longer forget the vanquished’ (Mbembe 2006). At least, the former ‘Novem-
ber 7 Avenue’, the major north–south highway connecting the airport to the
city, was renamed ‘Avenue Mohamed Bouazizi’.
6 Conclusion
Guided by the the ‘Anti-Clock Project’, our navigation of three of the most
important memorial sites in the urban space of Tunis helped us read the
palimpsestic nature of the city and analyze in detail how the configuration of
this complexweb of historicalmarkers and their respectivemediation of mem-
ory unfolded over time. Like the initial process of decolonization, the latest rev-
olution did not fully annihilate the prevailing monumental landscape. On the
contrary, it further enhanced its historical complexity. Throughout our guided
journey, the contrasting imbricated strata of the monumental landscape that
constitute this historical complexity were clearly spelled out. Although these
were erased during the historical process of national liberation, the material
translation of the colonial civilizingmission still forms the pedestal, or the base
stratum, of the monumental landscape today. Although erased by the Novem-
berist regime, the monumentalization of the modernist ambitions of the first
postcolonial regime has been re-integrated into the urban space of Tunis.
Although erased by the recent revolution, the master signifier of the Novem-
beristmonumental landscape still stands in themiddle of the capital. By focus-
ing on the restoration of these historical traces and the documentation of their
erasures, it is clear that the colonial, and ‘Bourguibist’ and ‘Novemberist’, city
texts never fully disappeared, rather they were preserved, rewritten and even-
tually piled-up in what constitutes the contemporary monumental landscape.
While both the formal style elements and the juxtaposition of the differ-
ent elements in the urban space of Tunis might imply a thoughtful balance
between tradition and modernity, the historical markers that constitute the
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monumental landscape do not contradict the fundamental linear conceptions
of time ingrained in the normative idea that progress, innovation, moderniza-
tion and development guarantees a better future. The contemporary city text,
in its historical complexity, intertextuality and ambiguity, only confirms in its
form and content the comforting and hegemonic character of modern tempo-
ral linearity. The tenacity of the last monument standing could therefore be
read as an aesthetic translation of a state of social paralysis that freezes social
dialectics and upholds a dual self-image or an internalized historical duality
and supposed incompatibility between a backward Islamic past and a uni-
form democratic future. The singular promise of civilization that constituted
the colonial city text was never unleashed, rather it was just transformed into
the singular promise of democratization endlessly repeated in the formation of
the postcolonial city texts. Despite the aporia of time provoked by the sponta-
neous cathartic eradication of the ‘Novemberist monumental landscape’, and
despite the momentary dignifying expulsion of the bifurcated self-image or
inner duality during the ephemeral revolutionary moment, Tunisia resumed
its race on the secular highway of progress and transition in the direction of
the singular democratic future the world system prescribes. Fueled by a well-
delineated and knowledgeable reading of its past sculpted in its monumental
landscape, the current regime—again—restrains its political sensibilities to
a singular present that witholds the imagination of any potentially dignified
futures. Thus, the clock tower, and more importantly the regime it represents,
will probably stand tomorrow, symbolizing the apparently inexhaustible desire
for, and transition to, democracy.
Though the slogan ‘Our 14 will never be 7×2’ has now been clarified, by now
it should also be clear that this promise soundedmore convincing directly after
Ben Ali fled the country than it does today. As we now see, the central square
of the postcolonial monumental landscape that was renamed ‘November 7
Square’ during the Ben Ali regime has now been renamed ‘January 14 Square’.
This does not mean that the date the autocrat fled is destined to become a
new form of symbolic domination twice as strong as the Novemberist sym-
bolic domination. Nevertheless, the inhabitants of Sidi Bouzid, the city where
the revolution initially started, organize their annual commemoration the day
Tarek el-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire, provoking nationwide
protests. The yearly commemoration of the revolution on December 17 in Sidi
Bouzid not only contributes to a new culture that commemorates the van-
quished who sacrificed their lives for a liberated and dignified future, it also
(provisionally at least) refuses to see the revolution as a historical rupture. As
the last monument of the ‘Novemberist landscape’ was not destroyed, and in
the absence of a monument in memory of the martyrs of the revolution in the
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capital of the country, Sidi Bouzid resists the officially instated date of com-
memoration and saturates time with the remembrance of sacrifice. And thus
saturates time with the simple idea that the revolution will only end once this
sacrifice is made redundant.
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